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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
I. Introduction
Interest on Lawyers Trust Account ("IOLTA") programs'
have been approved in all fifty states and the District of Colum-
bia.2 These programs convert what traditionally were non-interest-
bearing client trust accounts into interest-bearing accounts which
channel the new-found interest into programs promoting the public
good, principally the provision of legal services to the poor.
Though relatively recent in origin, IOLTA programs have become
an integral component of state bar strategies to improve the
availability of basic legal services to low-income citizens. Nation-
wide, the programs currently generate about $100 million a year,3
second only to federal Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") grants
as a source of funding for legal services to low-income Americans.'
IOLTA funds help provide basic legal services to some 1,700,000
Americans in a given year.'
IOLTA programs were not implemented without initial
constitutional qualms; to some, the concept just appeared too good
to be true. A number of constitutional concerns were addressed.by
state courts in written administrative orders accompanying the
1. Such programs sometimes go by the acronym IOLA or IOTA. The authors use
IOLTA throughout, because it is the acronym in most common usage.
2. See, e.g., Brennan J. Torregrossa, Note, Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation: Is There an Iota of Property Interest in IOLTA?, 42
VILL. L. REV. 189, 191 (1997).
Indiana was the last holdout. The state supreme court rejected an IOLTA program
on three occasions, on the theory that, because "interest follows principal," IOLTA programs
take property owned by clients. See, e.g., In re Indiana State Bar Ass'n's Petition to
Authorize a Program Governing Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311, 312
(Ind. 1990). This opinion, however, issued over a spirited dissent by the chief justice, whose
position prevailed when Indiana adopted an IOLTA program in principle in 1995. See, e.g.,
Torregrossa, supra, at 191 n.8.
3. See, e.g., Joyce Price, Ruling May Impair Legal Aid for Poor: Texas Taps Interest to
Trust Funds, WASH. TIMES, Sep. 19, 1996, at A6 (stating that IOLTA programs generate
about $100 million a year); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 10-11, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found. (United States Supreme Court
1996) (No. 96-1578) (stating that IOLTA programs nationwide generated a high of $152.7
million in 1991 and, despite declining interest rates, about $96.4 million in 1995).
4. Rinat Fried, Legal Aid Groups Divide and Conquer, LEG. TIMES, Sep. 19, 1996, at
14 (stating that IOLTA is "typically a state's second-largest source of funding for public
interest law firms, after LSC").
5. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Phillips v. Washington Legal Found. (United
States Supreme Court 1996) (No. 96-1578).
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creation of IOLTA programs6 or in more traditional adversary
proceedings.7 These state rulings, as well as a 1987 federal court
contest that sought to derail Florida's pioneering program,'
resulted in a largely consistent series of opinions9 confirming the
constitutional validity of IOLTA programs. Legal commentators
generally concurred.1"
6. See In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust, 675 S.W.2d 355 (Ark. 1984); In re Interest on
Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1981); Petition by the Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478
N.W.2d 715 (Mass. 1985); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982);
Petition of New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258 (N.H. 1982) (per curiam); In re
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983); In re Adoption of
Amendments to C.P.R.D.R. 9-102 IOLTA, 102 Wash. 2d 1101 (1984).
7. See Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied
sub nom. Chapman v. State Bar of Cal., 474 U.S. 848 (1985).
8. See Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917
(1987). The American incarnation of the IOLTA concept, modeled on programs in several
foreign nations, originated in Florida. See Petition of N.H. Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1259.
9. The Indiana Supreme Court initially questioned the constitutionality of IOLTA
programs. That position, however, has since been reversed. See supra note 2.
10. The literature on IOLTA programs is extensive and generally supports the
constitutionality and wisdom of such programs. See, e.g., Katherine Elrich, "Equal Justice
Under the Law," (If You Can Afford It): Fifth Circuit Threatens Texas' IOLTA Program, 28
TEx. TEcH L. REV. 887 (1997); Gregory A. Hearing, Comment, Funding Legal Services for
the Poor: Florida's IOTA Program-Now is the Time to Make It Mandatory, 16 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 337 (1988) (stating that "IOTA is constitutional" and adding, "Now is the time
to make it mandatory"); Betsy Borden Johnson, Comment, "With Liberty and Justice For
All" IOL TA in Texas-The Texas Equal Access to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 725,
754 (1985) (stating that "either no property is taken from the client or an abstract right to
control interest probably does not merit constitutional protection"); Kenneth Paul Kreider,
Note, Florida's IOL TA Program Does Not "Take" Client Property for Public Use, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 369, 394 (1987) (confirming constitutionality of the program, through suggesting that
future advances in banking technology might raise a taking issue); Torregrossa, supra note
2, at 215 (stating that the Fifth Circuit in the Washington Legal Foundation case "incorrectly
found a constitutional property interest in the interest generated by clients' funds in IOLTA
accounts"); Mark F. Wolfe, Special Project, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts: A Proposal
for Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 835, 851 (1983) (stating that an IOLTA program can be
implemented "at no cost to the public, at no real loss to any individual client and within the
constitutional mandates of the fifth amendment's taking clause"); see also Thomas E. Baker
& Robert E. Wood, Jr., "Taking" A Constitutional Look At the State Bar of Texas Proposal
to Collect Interest on Attorney-Client Trust Accounts, 14 TEx. TECH L. REV. 327, 367 (1983)
(stating that the article suggests "a framework for debate" but that the authors "have not
sided with one viewpoint or the other"); Taylor S. Boone, Comment, A Source of Revenue
for the Improvement of Legal Services (Parts I & I1), 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539 (1979), 11 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 113, 128 (1979) (recommending client waivers to assure constitutionality);
Thomas H. Gonser et al., Financing Public Services Activities With Interest Bearing Attorney
Trust Accounts, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 219,221 (1979) (not specifically addressing constitutional-
ity, but concluding that IOLTA "may herald a new day in the continuing effort of the legal
profession to improve its contribution to society as a whole").
Some writers do support a contrary view. See, e.g., Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Social
Investing, IOLTA and the Law of Trusts: The Setlor's Case Against the Political Use of
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In the early 1990s, however, a new player, the Washington
Legal Foundation ("WLF"), came on the scene. After a First
Circuit panel rejected a federal challenge by the WLF to the
Massachusetts IOLTA program," the WLF strategically declined
to seek United States Supreme Court review. 2 Instead, the
organization shifted its sights to Texas, in the apparent hope that
a conservative district judge1 3 and the more conservative Fifth
Circuit could be persuaded to create a circuit split and set the stage
for a definitive United States Supreme Court ruling.
The strategy succeeded. In Washington Legal Foundation v.
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation,14 the WLF overcame an
unfavorable district court decision15 to secure a Fifth Circuit panel
ruling that the Texas IOLTA program infringed client property
rights. A deeply divided court denied en banc rehearing. 6 The
Charitable and Client Funds, 22 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 163, 192 (1980) (concluding that a typical
IOLTA program violates rights of free speech and political association); Amy L. Mauk,
Comment, Constitutional Law-Massachusetts IOLTA Program's Charitable Assignment of
Accrued Interest Not Taking in Violation of Fifth Amendment, 28 SUFFOLK L. REV. 807,815
(1994) (criticizing the First Circuit for "blindly follow[ing] precedent in holding that the
Massachusetts program does not take clients' property in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment"); Amanda French Palmer, Comment, A Critique of Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts Programs, 44 LA. L. REV. 999, 1036 (1984) (stating that "[t]he income earned on
a lawyer's trust account containing client funds is property of the client"); Risa I. Sackmary,
Note, IOLTA's Last Obstacle: Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found.'s
Faculty Analysis of Attorney's First Amendment Rights, 2 L.L. & POL'Y
187, 188 (1994) (stating that "compulsory IOLTA programs that support activities against
attorneys' political and ideological beliefs violate these fundamental [First Amendment]
rights"); Mary O'Bryne Sinibaldi, Note, The Taking Issue in California's Legal Service Trust
Account Program, 12 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 463, 512 (1984) (noting that "[t]he argument that
clients have no property rights in the interest is unlikely to withstand constitutional
scrutiny").
11. See Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
12. See, e.g., Michael A. Riccardi, 5th Circuit Causes Split on IOLTA Validity, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Sep. 24, 1996, at 1 (reporting that, according to the WLF's general counsel,
the organization elected not to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the Massachusetts case,
"taking the strategy of filing litigation elsewhere in hope of creating a split among the
circuits").
13. The WLF reportedly focused their efforts on Texas in the hope that "the turf in
Texas will be friendlier to their arguments." Eyes of Texas, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct.
3, 1994, at 38.
14. 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,
65 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 24, 1997).
15. Washington Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1
(W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 65 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 24, 1997).
16. See Washington Legal Found. v Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 106 F.3d 640
(5th Cir. 1996) (Benavides, J., dissenting from failure to grant a rehearing en banc) (joined
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United States Supreme Court has granted the IOLTA defendants'
petition for writ of certiorari 7 and oral argument is expected in
December 1997.
Part II of this article provides a brief sketch of the theory and
mechanics of IOLTA, using the Texas program as an example.
Part III presents an equally brief overview of prior constitutional
challenges to IOLTA programs, with a focus on the First and
Eleventh Circuit's rulings, and concludes with a summary of the
WLF's successful legal argument in the Fifth Circuit. Part IV
presents a more extended critique of the Fifth Circuit's position on
the Texas program. The authors conclude that the decision
incorrectly interprets Texas property and banking law and fails to
defer to the authoritative decision of a state supreme court,
operating in its legitimate administrative capacity, on a state law
issue.1
8
II. The Anatomy Of An IOLTA Program
In its opinion invalidating the Texas IOLTA program the Fifth
Circuit compared the theory behind an IOLTA account to a
medieval alchemist's attempt to manufacture gold from base metal,
a "something from nothing" scheme.'9 More accurately, IOLTA
programs represent an application of the Industrial Revolution's
concept of economy of scale. IOLTA permits the combination, for
accounting purposes, of client deposits that could not individually
earn interest because the costs of administration would exceed the
interest generated. This larger fund can be administered profitably
as a unit, although administrative or service costs would render the
account unprofitable if subdivided.
by Politz, C.J., Stewart and Parker, JJ.; King and Weiner, JJ., dissenting without opinion).
17. 65 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 24, 1997). The Washington Legal Foundation took the
unusual step of supporting the grant of certiorari to resolve the circuit split. See Respon-
dents' Memorandum in Response to the Petition, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found. (United
States Supreme Court 1996) (No. 96-1578). The group's legal counsel is reported to have
stated that WLF "would welcome a ruling that would apply to IOLTA programs in all 50
states." IOLTA Question Headed to Supreme Court, TEX. LAw., Feb. 24, 1997, at 55.
18. In the interest of fair disclosure, it should be pointed out that both authors are
Texas-licensed attorneys actively involved in the Texas IOLTA case, and thus might be
accused of having pro-IOLTA bias. See supra notes*, **. This "bias," however, is one
shared by the bench and bar of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, as well as by the
majority of academic writers. The authors' perspective therefore might be more properly
categorized (much as the authors hate the phase) as "conventional wisdom."
19. Washington Legal Foundation, 94 F.3d at 100.
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Lawyers and their clients often find it useful, for a variety of
reasons, to place client money in the lawyer's possession.' The
lawyer might prefer to have a retainer as security against future
billings, an insurance company might make a check payable to an
attorney in trust for the client, or funds might be placed in escrow
in anticipation of a real estate closing. For these and other
reasons,21 an attorney trust account can be a convenience for both
attorney and client. The deposit of client money to an attorney's
trust account, however, also offers a unique opportunity for an
attorney to abuse a client's trust.22 In consequence, such accounts
are the subject of legislative or judicial regulation.'
Until the comparatively recent past, the treatment of interest
on attorney trust accounts was an issue that did not arise in
practice. Ethics rules required an attorney to have trust funds
available on the client's demand.24 Demand deposit accounts,
however, did not, and still do not, earn interest.2  Client funds
therefore were placed in a no-interest demand deposit account
(DDA). 26  Only financial institution profited from the arrange-
ment.
In 1980, however, changes in banking laws made the creation
of interest-bearing Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW)
accounts possible.27 These accounts offered an attractive option
20. The practice supposedly dates to "the early part of the development of our common
law system of jurisprudence." Arthur J. England, Jr. & Russell E. Carlisle, History of Interest
on Trust Accounts Programs, 56 FLA. B.J. 101, 101 (1982).
21. See, e.g., Steve Peterson & W. Frank Newton, Trust Accounts and the New
Comprehensive Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts Rule, 52 TEX. B.J. 590, 590 (1989)
(stating that "[s]ettlements, recovered verdicts in personal injury and workers' compensation
cases, escrow of real estate closing funds, earnest money for the purchase of real or personal
property, pension and profit sharing funds to be transmitted to the trustee of the fund, and
funds to pay legitimate claims against a client are all obvious examples of client funds which
an attorney may, from time to time, hold").
22. See id. at 591 (stating that "violation of... rules [on identifying and safeguarding
client funds] probably results in more disbarments and resignations in lieu of disbarments
than any other single violation of the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility").
23. In Texas, the general requirements governing client trust funds are set out in TEX.
DiSC. R. PROF. CONDUCr 1.14.
24. See, e.g., TEX. DisC. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.14 (b) (stating that "a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitle to receive").
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 371a.
26. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10, at 724.
27. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1832
(1994) (authorizing NOW accounts).
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for clients whose funds left in trust with an attorney were sufficient-
ly large, or sufficiently long-term, to justify deposit in a separate
interest-bearing NOW account.
For those clients whose deposits were nominal or short-term
in nature, however, NOW accounts offered no benefits. The client
fund would not justify setting up a separate interest-bearing
account, either because the bank's service charge would exceed the
interest earned, or because the attorney's administrative expense in
setting up the account or accounting expenses in dividing interest
and expenses for a pooled account would exceed the interest that
otherwise might have been earned. Moreover, ethical consider-
ations would prohibit the attorney from placing the funds in a
NOW account and pocketing the interestl Nominal or short
term client trust funds therefore still were pooled and deposited in
a no-interest DDA.
The development of IOLTA accounts offered an ethical
alternative to a situation in which only financial institutions
previously had been the winners. Nominal or short term trust
funds would be deposited in an interest-bearing NOW account or
its equivalent.29 Under the terms of the deposit contract, any
interest generated would be owned by a third party. In Texas, this
party is the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation." The
rights of clients are not affected, because an IOLTA-eligible client
would not receive interest from a deposit in any event.
For a Texas attorney who administers client trust funds, the
decision whether to place those funds into an IOLTA account or
into an interest-bearing account for the client's benefit is an
important one. Client funds that could productively earn interest
for the client should not be placed in an IOLTA account.31
Rather, the only funds eligible for IOLTA are those that are
"nominal in amount or held for a short period of time" and that,
28. See, e.g., Petition of New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261 (N.H. 1982)
(stating that "[t]he basic principle derived from Canon 9 is that an attorney cannot profit
from his client's funds").
29. TEXAS RULES OF COURT-STATE, Rules Governing the Operation of the Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation, Rule 4 (West 1997) (hereinafter "IOLTA Rules").
30. Id. (stating that the Foundation "shall hold the entire beneficial interest in the
interest earned").
31. See, e.g. Petition of New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1261 (stating that
"[b]asic principles of the law of agency and trusts seem to compel the conclusion that at
some point it would be irresponsible for an attorney not to deposit a client's funds in an
interest-bearing trust account, and pay such interest to the client").
1997]
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standing alone, "could not reasonably be expected to earn interest
for the client., 32  In making this determination, the attorney is
directed to consider the practicalities of the situation, including the
"cost of establishing and maintaining the account, service charges,
accounting costs and tax reporting costs.
33
On occasion, the question of whether a particular fund
qualifies for IOLTA treatment is a close one. The IOLTA rules
provide that the attorney "should exercise good faith judgment"
and conduct periodic reviews to ascertain if circumstances originally
justifying placement of the funds in an IOLTA account have
changed.34  In addition, the Texas Equal Access to Justice Found-
ation has sometimes "rebated" money to clients when an attorney
has erred by depositing funds into an IOLTA account that could
productively have earned interest for the client on their own.
III. Constitutional Challenges To IOLTA Programs
A. An Overview of Prior Constitutional Challenges
To someone not familiar with banking law or trust accounts,
IOLTA programs may seem just a little too good to be true:
surely, the thinking goes, someone had to have owned the $100
32. IOLTA Rule 6. The rule reads, in full:
The funds of a particular client are nominal in amount or held for a short period
of time, and thus eligible for use in the Program, if such funds, considered without
regard to funds of other clients which may be held by the attorney, law firm or
professional corporation, could not reasonably be expected to earn interest for the
client or if the interest which might be earned on such funds is not likely to be
sufficient to offset the cost of establishing and maintaining the account, service
charges, accounting costs and tax reporting costs which would be incurred in
attempting to obtain interest on such funds for the client. Also to be considered
are the nature of the proceeding or transaction involved and the likelihood of
delay in the need for such funds in such proceeding or transaction. The attorney,
law firm or professional corporation should exercise good faith judgment in
determining initially whether client funds should be included in the Program and
should review at reasonable intervals whether changed circumstances require




35. Telephone interview with Joyce Lindsey, Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation
(July 29, 1997). The word "rebate" technically is a misnomer, since the client never had a
contractual right to the interest. Nor is there a requirement in the IOLTA rules that such
a "rebate" ever be made. The Foundation board has, however, made a determination that
a payment to the client under such circumstances is consistent with the program's overall
philosophy. Id.
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million or more that IOLTA programs nationwide have generated.
This "gut-level" feeling, combined with a distaste on the part of
some attorneys for the "liberal" programs that some IOLTA funds
support, has generated several court decisions addressing constitu-
tional concerns. The box score, at least until the Texas IOLTA
case came along, gave considerable comfort to IOLTA supporters:
IOLTA programs had been upheld in nine administrative or
adversary decisions;36 Indiana, the sole negative voice, reversed its
position by adopting an IOLTA program in 1995.37
The constitutional concerns that have been raised in these
cases are varied, and include "void for vagueness," equal protec-
tion, rights to counsel, and First Amendment "compelled speech"
claims.38 The most consistent and seriously treated of the consti-
tutional complaints, however, is a Fifth Amendment "taking"
claim39 applied through the Fourteenth Amendment,' the asser-
tion that some client property right is infringed when interest from
a pooled IOLTA account is funneled to public purposes. The
authors will not attempt to rehearse all the arguments made by all
the courts that have addressed the issue." Instead, both because
the arguments are representative, and because the cases constitute
the circuit split that the United States Supreme Court is expected
to resolve in Phillips, analysis will be limited to the recent First and
Eleventh Circuit decisions.
Cone v. State Bar of Florida42 was a class action challenge to
the Florida IOLTA program by the estate of a client, naming as
defendants a law firm, the State Bar of Florida and the Florida Bar
Foundation. The claim was that the client had been deprived of
$2.25 in interest when the $13.75 remainder of a cost deposit was
mistakenly placed in an IOLTA account for several years instead
36. See supra notes 6-11.
37. See supra note 2.
38. The first three arguments were addressed in the California Carroll decision; the First
Amendment claim was dealt with most directly by the First Circuit in the Washington Legal
Foundation case. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation, 993 F.2d 996, 976-80 (5th Cir. 1996); Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr.
305, (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation").
40. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978)
(applying Fifth Amendment "taking" prohibition to state action).
41. For an excellent, recent analysis that goes into a bit more depth, see Torregrossa,
supra note 1.
42. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987).
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of being refunded to the client at the conclusion of the litigation.43
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with a summary of federal
law, noting that federal "takings" principles "are designed to
protect the claimant's reasonable, often investment-backed
expectations, rather than inchoate unilateral expectations."'  The
Eleventh Circuit analyzed the options from the client's perspective:
no prospect of a separate interest-bearing NOW account and no
expectation that the comparatively trivial amount of interest
attributable to the client's fund could be assigned to her without
unacceptable administrative costs. The court concluded, quoting
the district court opinion with approval, that "[t]he end result of
these economic and practical impediments to individual investment
of [IOLTA] funds is to negate any reasonable unilateral expecta-
tion, much less a mutually explicit understanding, that a client...
should receive interest generated by the [IOLTA] program." 5
Before closing the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit panel found
it advisable, as several other courts have found it advisable, to
address a United States Supreme Court opinion relied upon by the
plaintiffs. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith46 involved a
challenge to the validity of a Florida statutory scheme aimed at
funds deposited in court registries that had the effect of channeling
potential interest from individual litigants to state coffers.
Eckerd's, while in the process of buying Webb's assets for some
$1.8 million, discovered that Webb's debts probably exceeded the
purchase price. Accordingly, Eckerd's filed an interpleader action,
named Webb's and 200 or so creditors as defendants, and deposited
$1.8 million into the court's registry.47 Following Florida law, the
court clerk assessed a substantial fee for its registry services and
retained all interest as "deemed income" of the clerk's office.48
The parties did not challenge the propriety of the service
charge. The United States Supreme Court, however, noted that the
statutes would permit the county "to exact two tolls" for its registry
services,49 one when the fee was assessed and another when the
43. Id. at 1004.
44. Id at 1005 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-
25 (1978)).
45. Id. at 1006 (quoting the district court opinion).
46. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
47. Id. at 156-57.
48. See id at 157-58, 156 n.1.
49. Id. at 159.
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interest was diverted. The court rejected the Florida Supreme
Court's view that the principal became "public money" once it was
deposited into the court's registry, observing that this deposit was
temporary." Because the funds still belonged to the litigants, the
"usual and general rule is that any interest on an interpleaded and
deposited fund follows the principal.",
51
The Cone court acknowledged a "superficial similarity"52
between the issues addressed in Webb's and those surrounding an
IOLTA account. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the cases
were distinguishable because, unlike the Florida IOLTA client, the
interpleader litigants in Webb's had a "legitimate expectation of
interest exclusive of administrative costs and expenses '53 in the
$1.8 million of interpleaded funds. Because the use of the client
money had "no net value," the court concluded that "there could
be no property interest for the state to appropriate."54  The
Eleventh Circuit emphasized that it was not suggesting that the
$2.25 in interest was a "de minimis" taking; rather, "there was no
taking of any property of the plaintiff"'5 5  The United States
Supreme Court denied an application for writ of certiorari in Cone,
as it had in a California decision also raising constitutional
issues.56
The 1990s, however, saw a substantially new objection to
IOLTA surface. While still couching arguments in terms of
property rights, IOLTA opponents now focused more on the ends
for which IOLTA funds were used than on the constitutionality of
the means by which those funds were created. The principal actor
in the conservative assault on IOLTA, the Washington Legal
Foundation (WFL), decried IOLTA programs as a "hidden
scheme" by "left-wing lawyers" to "reach into the pockets of small
businessmen and the middle class to fund their radical agenda."57
Professor Charles Rounds of the Suffolk University Law School
provided apparent intellectual support for this position when he
published an article purporting to identify a property and free
50. Id.
51. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 162.
52. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.
53. Id. at 1007 (quoting the district court opinion).
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. See Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Reptr. 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
57. John C. Scully, Hidden Scheme to Finance Radical Lawyers Plagues Pacific
Northwest, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 31, 1992.
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speech interest in a client's "right" to keep unproductive property
in an unproductive state.5 8 The WLF responded by filing a test
case in Rounds' back yard.59
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar
Foundation" the WLF, two attorneys and two clients sued the
agencies and officials who administered the Massachusetts IOLTA
program, claiming that the program violated their First and Fifth
Amendment rights. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims6'
and the First Circuit affirmed.
The Fifth Amendment taking claim advanced by the Washing-
ton Legal Foundation plaintiffs in the Massachusetts case was
modeled on Professor Rounds' trust theories.62 Plaintiffs argued
that one of the sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right
58. See Rounds, supra note 10. A detailed analysis of the arguments in Professor
Rounds' article is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, three brief observations
might be of interest. First, Rounds correctly identifies the fiduciary relationship in an
attorney trust account as one running from attorney to client. Id. at 177. It therefore seems
odd that, in both of the test cases filed by the WLF, attorney and client have joined as
plaintiffs. Second, Rounds suggests that an attorney advise a client of the potential uses to
which IOLTA funds will be put. No IOLTA program of which the authors are aware
prohibits this, nor does any program prohibit attorney or client from eschewing the use of
a trust account altogether.
Finally, Rounds' principal argument, that the client has an inherent power to prohibit
productive use of trust funds, a property right which IOLTA programs supposedly take away,
see, e.g., id. at 181-82, glosses over the facts. Before IOLTA, clients with nominal or short
term funds in trust had no property right to exclude others from the use of those fund to
generate interest. By virtue of the attorney's contract with the bank, the accounts were non-
interest bearing. The client had only a "take it or leave it" choice to accept the contract
terms. No one would say that a bank depositor retains any "right" to object if the bank
makes money by lending the deposit at interest to a right-wing political action group, a
polluting industrial concern or even a financially-strapped IOLTA program.
IOLTA changes nothing. After IOLTA, the attorney's contract with the bank
provides for third-party ownership of any interest generated on the account. The client still
has no choice in the matter, only a "take it or leave it" decision on whether to put the funds
in trust at all. While, in Rounds' opinion, it might be better to give clients an option
between a non-interest bearing trust account and an IOLTA account, that question is simply
one of public policy, without constitutional implications. Property rights as regards interest,
viewed from the perspective of the client with a nominal or short term account, are the same
in either the pre- or post-IOLTA world: The client simply has no options and no reasonable
expectation of excluding others from use of the monies deposited.
59. See Dick Dahl, IOLTA Antagonist Feels Responsibility to Speak Out, MASS.
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct. 19, 1992, at 31 (quoting Professor Rounds as explaining that the
Washington Legal Foundation originally was planning to file suit in Ohio, but changed its
target state after reviewing his article).
60. 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
61. Washington Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found. 795 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1992),
affd, 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
62. See supra note 58.
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to exclude others from your property.63 Thus, went the argument,
even if clients could not expect to profit from IOLTA interest, they
still have a "beneficial interest" in that property, including the right
to exclude others from its use.'
The First Circuit was not convinced, for many reasons. The
court expressed doubt that trust law could be imported wholesale
into attorney trust accounts, noted that the "right to exclude" had
not been extended by case law to intangible property. The court
also questioned whether the government's involvement in IOLTA
accounts could be characterized as a "physical invasion. "65
Moreover, even if such a "right to exclude" were implicated, no
"taking" would result. Quoting the United States Supreme Court's
observation that, "where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property fights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not
a taking,, 66 the court concluded that the supposed "right to
exclude" was "at best, a thin strand in the commonly recognized
bundle of property rights.
67
More fundamentally, like the Eleventh Circuit in Cone, the
First Circuit simply could not identify a property fight. The court
pointed to the statement in Webb's that "a mere unilateral
expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled
to protection., 68 While repeating the Cone court's concession that
there were "some superficial similarities" on the facts, the First
Circuit focused on a "fundamental difference," that the Webb's
plaintiffs had a recognized right to the interest generated by the
interpleaded funds, while the IOLTA client plaintiffs had none.69
The Rounds "right to exclude" theory even boomeranged on the
plaintiffs: the First Circuit believed the plaintiffs resorted to this
questionable legal theory only because they knew that they could
show no property right in the interest per se.7"
The First Amendment claims received short shrift from the
First Circuit, principally because those claims were seen to collapse
into the Fifth Amendment property issue. The plaintiffs argued
63. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (takings case
involving a partially improved pond in Hawaii).
64. Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 974.
65. Id. at 974-75.
66. Id. at 976 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 973 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
69. Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 975.
70. Id. at 976.
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that IOLTA "compels lawyers, and therefore clients, to participate
in the IOLTA program and therefore support lobbying and
litigation for ideological and political causes."'" The First Circuit
assumed, in deference to the fact that the suit was dismissed on the
pleadings, that attorneys and clients were compelled to participate
in IOLTA.72 The remaining question was whether that compelled
participation infringed free speech rights.
The First Circuit examined the parallels between forced
participation in IOLTA and forced payment of bar dues for
lobbying activities,7 3 and concluded that the analogy was not
persuasive. Neither lawyer nor client was forced to contribute
money to a political cause with which that person disagreed,
because neither lawyer nor client had any property right in the
interest earned on the trust funds.74
B. Constitutional Issues in the Texas IOLTA Case
The Washington Legal Foundation and its allies did not take
their loss in the First Circuit lightly. Professor Rounds even
attributed the loss to the fact that "the IOLTA scheme is a
creature of the judicial branch, 75  whose members presumably
stick together. As stated earlier, the WLF elected not to seek a
writ of certiorari in the Massachusetts case.76 Instead, the organi-
zation looked to Texas in the hope of creating a circuit split. While
the decision to sue in Texas may have had an element of turf
selection,77 it also had an element of happenstance. A Suffolk
Law School graduate and former student of Professor Rounds, who
had been denied leave to file an amicus curiae brief in the First
Circuit case,78 was ready and willing to act as plaintiff.
The decision of the WLF to pick Texas as the next site for a
test case also had some elements of comic irony. The most
71. Id.
72. Id. at 978.
73. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (recognizing that First Amendment
implications are raised by compelled financial support of unions and bar organizations that
engage in ideological or political activities).
74. Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 979-80.
75. Mark A. Cohen, 1st Circuit Upholds Validity of IOLTA Rule: Opponents May
Appeal to U.S. Supreme Court, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, May 31, 1993, at 2 (quoting
Professor Charles Rounds).
76. See supra note 12.
77. See supra note 13.
78. Interview with Michael Mazzone, July 29, 1997.
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prominent of the supposed "left-wing lawyers ' 9 who had set the
wheels in motion for the mandatory Texas IOLTA program was
State Bar President Joe Nagy, more accurately described by the
press as a "conservative defense lawyer ... of Lubbock.""0 The
mandatory program was implemented under the leadership of Chief
Justice Tom Phillips, the first elected Republican Chief Justice in
Texas since Reconstruction days."l The Texas Supreme Court,
whose members are individually named as defendants, includes
seven Republican, 2 one a former attorney with George Bush's
personal law firm. 3 One of the court's two Democratic justices
is considered so conservative that the Republicans declined to run
an opponent in the last election.' 4 Together, these judges form a
body whose decisions are seen by many to lean in a decidedly pro-
business direction. Add to this the fact that the Texas IOLTA
program has relatively strict restrictions on the uses to which
money can be put, 6 and the state hardly would have seemed like
a prime target for conservative ire.
Nonetheless, suit was filed. The structure of the case was
much like the earlier Massachusetts action, with the WLF, an
attorney and a client combining to sue the agencies that implement
and administer the Texas IOLTA program. The district court
initially denied a motion to dismiss, getting plaintiffs over the
hurdle they failed to clear in Massachusetts.' After examining
79. See Scully, supra note 57.
80. Janet Elliott, The Outsider; President Newton Brings Different Approach to Pro
Bono Problem, TEx. LAWYER, June 23, 1997, at 1.
81. Few Judicial Surprises, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 21, 1998, at 6 (reporting Phillips' election
as the first Republican chief justice in Texas since Reconstruction).
82. These are Chief Justice Phillips, and Justices Hecht, Cornyn, Enoch, Owen, Baker
and Abbott.
83. Justice Priscilla Owen is a former partner in the Houston firm, Andrews & Kurth.
Former Secretary of State James Baker also was a partner in this firm.
84. See, e.g., Deborah Quinn Hensel, GOP Takes Slots on Criminal Appeals, High
Court, Hous. PosT, Nov. 9, 1994, at A15 (also noting that Justice Gonzalez "sometimes
aided with Republicans").
85. See, e.g., Janet Elliott & Robert Elder, Jr., Hyperactive Supreme Court Continues to
Expend Power, TEX. LAWYER, July 28, 1997, at 15 (noting that defendants won 71% of
traditional plaintiff's bar/defense bar cases in 1996-97, down from 83% in the 1995-96 term).
86. Texas IOLTA rules provide specifically that "[n]o funds shall be granted ... to
directly fund class action suits, lawsuits against governmental entities, or lobbying for or
against any candidate or issue." IOLTA Rule 15. The rule does not, however, prohibit suits
on behalf of individuals to collect government benefits. Id.
87. Professor Rounds viewed this action as an indication that the court was "interested
in hearing the full breadth of the constitutional arguments," in contrast to the First Circuit.
Henriette Campagne, No Dismissal of Texas IOLTA Challenge, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY,
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detailed summary judgment evidence, however, the district court
ruled for the IOLTA defendants.88
As in the Massachusetts case, the WLF advanced both First
and Fifth Amendment claims. The District court followed the lead
of the First and Eleventh Circuits. Relying on United States
Supreme Court authority to the effect that a taking must interfere
with interests "bound up with reasonable expectations,"89 the
district court concluded that a client whose attorney places nominal
or short term funds in an IOLTA account has no reasonable
expectation of earning interest. The court noted that "[t]his
'reasonable expectation' of a property interest is foreclosed by the
very wording and operation of the rules governing the IOLTA
program-that is, if there is any reasonable expectation of realizing
net interest on a sum, the sum is exempted from IOLTA cover-
age."9  The plaintiffs' subsidiary argument, that the client had
some "right to exclude others" from use of the funds deposited,
also failed. The district court noted that in the few cases involving
intangible property in which such a right had been recognized, the
"right to exclude" had been invoked to protect the property from
harm.91 Finally, the district court dismissed the First Amendment
claims in short order, based in large part on the finding that the
client had no property interest. 92
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed.93 The panel did not
mention the WLF's novel claims-that there was some "beneficial
interest" or "right to exclude" accruing to clients, or that First
Amendment rights of free expression were infringed.94 Instead,
the panel explicitly broke with the First and Eleventh Circuits, as
well as opinions from several state courts, in order to hold that the
United States Supreme Court decision in Webb's compelled a
finding that clients had an ownership interest in the interest
Oct 31, 1994, at 2.
88. Washington Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1
(W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 65 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 24, 1997).
89. 873 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
125 (1978)).
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d 996.
94. The proof required to prevail on a First Amendment claim at trial was mentioned
in passing in the closing sentences of the discussion. See id. at 1004.
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generated on client trust funds," an argument so doubtful that the
WLF did not even raise it in the First Circuit challenge. 96
The difference in argument style between the Fifth Circuit and
prior circuit rulings, so far as reference to Webb's is concerned, is
profound. Both the First and Eleventh Circuits viewed Webb's as
a case bound by its facts,97 a conclusion that would seem to be
reinforced by the United States Supreme Court's extremely limited
holding. 8 Moreover, both the First and Eleventh Circuits obser-
ved that in Webb's, a critical fact was that the size of the amount
deposited gave the litigants a "reasonable expectation" of inter-
est.99
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit's decision in the Texas case
viewed Webb's as setting out "a rule that is independent of the
amount or value of interest at issue."1" That overarching rule
was that "[t]he earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the
fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property."101
95. See id. at 1003-03.
96. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
97. The Eleventh Circuit placed some emphasis on the fact that the principal funds at
issue in Webb were capable of generating large amounts of interest. See Cone, 819 F.2d at
1002. The First Circuit, however, found it easier to distinguish Webb on the grounds that the
WLF claimed no property right at all in the IOLTA interest. See Washington Legal Found.,
993 F.2d at 975.
98. In Webb, the United States Supreme Court held as follows:
We hold that under the narrow circumstances of this case-where there is a
separate and distinct state statute authorizing a clerk's fee "for services rendered"
based upon the amount of principal deposited; where the deposited fund itself
concededly is private; and where the deposit in the court's registry is required by
state statute in order for the depositor to avail itself of statutory protection from
claims of creditors and others-Seminole County's taking unto itself ... the
interest earned on the interpleader fund while it was in the registry of the court
was a taking violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We express no
view as to the constitutionality of a statute that prescribes a county's retention of
interest earned, where the interest would be the only return to the county for
services it renders.
449 U.S. at 164-65. The Fifth Circuit thus took a ruling that the United States Fifth Circuit
was not certain extended even to all interpleader accounts, and made of it a general rule
applicable to all bank accounts, including IOLTA funds.
99. See Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 973 (quoting Webb's for the proposition
that "a mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled to
protection"); Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007 (quoting the district court's conclusion, in the context
of discussing Webb's, that "the crucial distinction is not the amount of the interest earned,
but that the circumstances led to a legitimate expectation of interest exclusive of adminis-
trative costs and expenses" (emphasis added)).
100. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1002.
101. Id. at 1002 (quoting Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164).
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The Fifth Circuit viewed the Cone court's conclusion that a client
had no expectation of net interest, and thus no property right in an
IOLTA account as being a "de minimis" taking argument, though
it acknowledged that "the Eleventh Circuit explicitly says other-
wise."" The opinion also referred to Texas law to bolster its
position and expressed public policy concerns. Those arguments,
however, will be discussed in more detail in the critique which
follows.
The Fifth Circuit denied a suggestion for en banc rehearing,
but with an extended dissenting opinion.'O Among other argu-
ments, the dissenters pointed to the fact that in Webb's the United
States Supreme Court had stated that "[tihe earnings of a fund are
incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as
the fund itself is property."" The dissenters concluded, "A clear
implication of this holding is that if a fund generates no earnings to
which its owner is entitled, there is no cognizable property
interest."1 5
IV. A State Law-Based Critique Of The Fifth Circuit's Reason-
ing In Phillips
Even though a decision in Phillips will have ramifications for
the continued viability of all IOLTA programs, the United States
Supreme Court decision ultimately will rest on a threshold
determination of Texas property law. The Fifth Amendment
protects private property from uncompensated state takings."°
However, it does not define "property" or give rise to a federal
common law of property. As the United States Supreme Court has
stated, "Property interests.., are not created by the Constitution.
102. Id. It is difficult to know precisely what to make of the Fifth Circuit's claimed
omniscience in seeing through the deceptive surface of the Eleventh Circuit's arguments to
discern what really is "inherent" in its analysis. Cf. Gregory S. Coleman & James W.
Paulsen, Fifth Circuit Survey: Civil Procedure, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 577, 577-80 (1996)
(surveying Fifth Circuit decisions on the general subject of telepathy). What is certain,
however, is that the Eleventh Circuit would vigorously deny engaging in the line of reasoning
of which the Fifth Circuit accuses it. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 99.
103. Washington Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 106 F.3d 640 (5th
Cir. 1996) (Benavides, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (joined by Politz, C.J.,
Stewart and Parker, JJ.; King and Weiner, JJ., dissenting without opinion).
104. Id. at 643 (quoting Webb's 449 U.S. at 164) (emphasis is Judge Benavides').
105. Id.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation").
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Rather they are created by and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."1°7
The Fifth Circuit's opinion paid lip service to the binding effect
of Texas law."~ Nonetheless, the panel cited only one state court
decision, and that one almost in passing,1" before it proceeded to
an extended discussion of the United States Supreme Court's ruling
in Webb's."1° While Webb's is an interesting and relevant inter-
pleader decision' that already has been discussed in some
detail,112 Erie"3 and Fifth Amendment considerations dictate
that analysis of the correctness of the Fifth Circuit's decision must
begin with Texas law. Judged by reference to Texas principles of
property and banking law, the Fifth Circuit's ruling leaves much to
be desired.
A. "Interest Follows Principal": The Creation of a False
Universal Rule of Texas Law
The touchstone of the Fifth Circuit's opinion, and the only
point at which the court explicitly refers to Texas authority, is the
statement that "Texas observes the traditional rule that 'interest
follows principal', which recognizes that interest earned on a
deposit of principal belongs to the owner of the principal. '1 4 In
support of this supposed general rule, the panel cited a 1972 Texas
Supreme Court decision, Sellers v. Harris County.115
Because Sellers is the only Texas authority upon which the
Fifth Circuit relied for its conclusion, it deserves close consider-
107. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
108. See Washington Legal Foundation, 94 F.3d at 1000 (acknowledging that "[s]tate law
defines 'property"').
109. See id. at 1000 n.17 (citing Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1972)).
110. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
111. Webb's actually cited a Texas case, Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.
1972), three times. See id. at 159, 161 & 162. The Sellers decision, which also is the only
Texas decision relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in Washington Legal Foundation, is discussed
infra. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 46-54, 95-101 and accompanying text.
113. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The case is not precisely Erie, in
that the issue presented is a federal "takings" question, not a diversity-generated attempt to
resolve a state law issue. Nonetheless, Erie-style analysis-discerning Texas property rights
by resort to Texas authority-is required to determine the threshold "property" question.
114. Washington Legal Foundation, 94 F.3d at 1000.




ation. Before doing so, however, three very simple observations
might help to gauge the nature of the Fifth Circuit's analysis: first,
the Fifth Circuit distilled Texas law to a "general rule" catch-phrase
never used in a Texas case. Second, the court ignored the fact that
such a general rule would have some obvious exceptions. Finally,
the panel glossed over substantial differences in the factual
predicate of the only Texas case on which it relied. Each of these
statements deserves some brief explanation.
First, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's statement, the Texas
Supreme Court in Sellers never once used the phrase "interest
follows principal," whether stated as a "traditional rule" or
otherwise.1 6  Moreover, while the Fifth Circuit introduced its
citation to Sellers with an "e.g." signal, implying that other Texas
cases also have espoused the "interest follows principal" rule,"7
that implication is questionable. Judging from Texas cases in the
Westlaw and LEXIS databases, which include Texas appellate
opinions from the late 1880s on, one can say with some confidence
that no Texas court in the modern era seems ever to have used the
phrase, "interest follows principal," whether in a holding, as dicta,
or otherwise.
n8
Second, the Fifth Circuit's declaration that "interest follows
principal" is demonstrably wrong, at least if elevated to the level of
an absolute legal rule. Take, for example, an "income-only" trust.
The settlor leaves a sum of money in trust, with income distributed
to a designated beneficiary during life, and the corpus to another
beneficiary on the income beneficiary's death. 9 In such a case,
interest does not follow principal. Instead, by the terms of the trust
agreement, ownership is divided.
116. See id.
117. See COLUMBIA L. REV. ET AL., THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION
§ 1.2, at 22 (15th Ed. 1991) (stating that "e.g." indicates that "other authorities also state the
proposition, but citation to them would not be helpful or is not necessary").
118. The closest any case comes to the point is a statement, in the summary of counsel's
argument in a 1888 case, that "[i]n the absence of an agreement, interest follows the principal
as a legal incident .... State v. Wilson, 71 Tex. 291, 293 (1888) (emphasis added). The
decision is also reported in West Publishing Company's South Western Reporter, but without
summaries of counsel's argument. See State v. Wilson, 9 S.W. 155 (Tex. 1888). Even if one
were to treat this statement in counsel's argument as authoritative (which, of course, one
should not), the phrase "[iln the absence of an agreement" would direct one to consider the
actual agreement between the particular financial institution and its attorney depositor.
119. An example of such a trust agreement, though not one in which the validity of this
arrangement was at issue, may be found in Price v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 522 S.W.2d 725 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Another example is more arcane, but for Texans, much more
pervasive. Texas is one of the nation's nine community property
states, and it tends to be a "minority rule" state even among these
jurisdictions. Suppose that a married depositor in Texas deposits
an inheritance into an interest-bearing account on which only the
depositor can sign. Applying only the rule that "interest follows
principal," one would conclude, wrongly, that the depositor owns
all interest. However, under long settled rules, now codified,1"
interest on the depositor's funds is owned jointly by both spouses.
Even worse, at least from the depositor's point of view, one must
keep meticulous records. If the depositor cannot prove exactly how
much of the money in the account is separate property principal
and how much is community property interest, the entire sum will
be deemed community property."' In such a case, the Fifth
Circuit's supposed general rule would be stood on its head:
principal would follow interest. In sum, even if Texas did generally
accept the notion that "interest follows principal," it is a rule that
would be subject to variance by contract such as an "income only"
trust, or by operation of law, such as the Texas community
property statutes.
Because "interest follows principal" cannot be a truly universal
rule in Texas, the third preliminary point becomes crucial: the
Fifth Circuit panel, while relying on Texas property law as
expressed in Sellers, did not mention any of the facts of the case,
much less attempt to draw factual parallels between the interplead-
er account at issue in Sellers and IOLTA accounts. Instead, the
Fifth Circuit simply distilled Sellers to its perceived "essence"-the
questionable phrase, "interest follows principal"-and applied the
phrase to invalidate the Texas IOLTA program.
This is, of course, not what one would normally expect in legal
analysis."2 Rather, the precedential value of cases always mlst
120. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a)(2), (a)(4)(West 1993) (generally defining
revenue from separate property as sole management community property).
121. This result follows naturally from the statutory presumption that "[p]roperty
possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be
community property," which presumption is rebutted only on "clear and convincing
evidence" of its separate property status. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (West 1993).
122. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821) (per Chief Justice
Marshall, stating that if general expressions of law "go beyond the case, they must be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point
is presented for decision").
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be judged "in the light of the facts on which they are based."'"
The point was perhaps most eloquently made by Chief Justice Jack
Pope:
The strength of the common law and its stare decisis rule lies
in that thoroughness with which a case is tried after investiga-
tion and argument of issues fairly arising. To the extent that a
court overflows the issues and seeks to declare rules of law into
being by avulsion instead of accretion, it destroys the system.
... The solemnity and seriousness with which a court investi-
gates and writes upon an irrelevant point, may entitle it to
respect, but it is the respect due any learning and not the
respect of a rule of law by which inferior courts are bound.'24
In short, if an IOLTA account may be factually distinguished from
the interpleader account at issue in Sellers, then statements of law
in Sellers, even if general in their language, are not necessarily
binding.
The authors did not choose Justice Pope's explanation of the
Texas law of precedent at random. While Jack Pope was a
member of the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals when he wrote
the quoted opinion in 1962, he had been elevated to the Texas
Supreme Court and was an active participant in the 1972 Sellers
opinion."z  When the Texas Supreme Court implemented the
state's initial IOLTA program in 1984, Jack Pope-now Chief
Justice-spearheaded the effort. As will be discussed momentarily,
the court's 1984 administrative ruling is entitled to precedential
weight and a presumption of constitutionality no matter what the
composition of its members might be. Chief Justice Pope's active
involvement in the Sellers opinion, however, demonstrates that it
is not only legally improper but factually improbable to assume, as
the Fifth Circuit apparently assumed, that the Texas Supreme
Court simply forgot about Sellers when it implemented the IOLTA
program.
The more rational and legally sound approach would have
been to inquire whether any relevant factual differences between
123. Maruska v. Missouri, K & TRy. Co., 10 S.W.2d 211, (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1928,
writ ref'd).
124. State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853,878-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1961), affd, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962) (adopting court of appeals opinion).
125. Justice Pope, in fact, dissented from the initial Sellers opinion, which was withdrawn
on rehearing. See Sellers v. Harris County, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 280, 282 (Apr. 5, 1972),
withdrawn, 483 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1972).
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the type of account at issue in Sellers and a typical IOLTA account
might explain the Texas Supreme Court's decision to implement
the IOLTA program. The facts of Phillips can easily be distin-
guished from the facts of Sellers. Sellers involved a million-dollar
insurance policy, interpleaded into the registry of the court. The
court ordered the money deposited in an interest-bearing account
for the benefit of the litigants. The county clerk objected, pointing
out that under a state statute all interest from funds deposited with
the clerk's office-some $6000 per month in this case-was to go
to the county's general funds. The Texas Supreme Court ruled the
statute unconstitutional as a taking of private property without
compensation.
There are at least two obvious factual distinctions between
Sellers and the IOLTA challenge in Phillips. First, the basic
alignment of parties is different. In Sellers, the winning litigant
sued the supposed fiduciary who was both holding and benefitting
from his funds.1" If the alignment of parties were the same in
Phillips, the client would be suing his lawyer, the fiduciary with
whom the trust funds were placed." Instead, in Phillips the
lawyer and client joined to sue the Texas Supreme Court and Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation. Second, and more significant,
the interpled funds in Sellers obviously could have earned substan-
tial interest for the client. Phrased in constitutional language, the
interpleader claimants in Sellers had a "reasonable expectation"
that the funds could generate interest. By contrast, funds are
deposited in a Texas IOLTA account only after a preliminary
determination that they cannot make money for the client.
Nonetheless, the fact that the Fifth Circuit created a question-
able general principle of state law and applied that principle
without regard for possible legal or factual distinctions does not
necessarily mean that the panel arrived at an erroneous result. As
folks say down South, "Even a blind hog can find an occasional
126. In Texas, the district clerk is considered an official of the county. See, e.g., TEX.
CONST. art. 5, § 20; Emerson v. State, 727 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (stating
that county officers include the district clerk).
127. Indeed, this was the alignment of the parties in the Eleventh Circuit's Cone case.
See supra note 42 and accompanying test. The fact that lawyer and client are both
challenging the Texas IOLTA program in Phillips may have served to confuse the Fifth
Circuit, which focused on the details of account operation in order to determine whether
there was a property interest, rather than examining the client's options at the time the funds
were placed with the attorney. See infra text accompanying notes 161-177.
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acorn."" The next subsection demonstrates, however, that these
problems are not the only, or even the worst, analytical flaws in the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning.
B. A State Law-Based Mistake: Failure to Consider the Most
Recent Authoritative Rulings by a State's High Court
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of Texas law is fundamentally
flawed in that it fails to assign proper legal weight to the Texas
Supreme Court's administrative adoption of the IOLTA program.
The problem is profound. If one were to state that, in Erie-style
analysis, the Fifth Circuit had chosen to rely on generic language
in a 1972 Texas Supreme Court decision in preference to on-point
contrary rulings from the same court in 1984, 1985 and 1988, the
decision would raise quite a few eyebrows. Yet this is, in fact,
almost precisely what the Fifth Circuit panel did.
An administrative ruling from a court, acting within the sphere
of its authority, is entitled to some legal weight. The precise weight
might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, several
state supreme courts have accompanied their enactment of IOLTA
programs with formal opinions addressing constitutional consider-
ations. 29 Few would question that such rulings are authoritative
expressions on the constitutional points in question.130  Other
128. Some of these folks are even Fifth Circuit judges. See Southern Constructors Group
v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1993) (criticizing the "blind-hog-finds-an-
occasional-acorn" theory of reading confused pleadings).
129. See supra note 2.
130. The WLF's briefing in Phillips implies that these decisions are somehow less
authoritative because they were not formal adversary proceedings. See, e.g., Respondent's
Memorandum in Response to the Petition, Phillips v. Washington Legal Found. (United
States Supreme Court 1996) (No. 96-1378) stating that six of the decisions favoring the
constitutionality of IOLTA are "non-adversarial advisory opinions"). The WLF does not cite
any authority to suggest that the opinions therefore are entitled to any less precedential
weight, or are not authoritative expressions of state law. The First and Eleventh Circuit gave
weight to these administrative rulings. See Washington Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 968 (citing
Massachusetts and other state administrative decisions); Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006 (citing
Florida and other state administrative decisions). Nor does the administrative nature of the
ruling mean that the matter was uncontested. The Minnesota opinion, for example, explicitly
notes that the court's decision was preceded by public notice and formal hearings. See In
re Petition of Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1982). The Massachusetts court
actively solicited briefs, which uniformly favored the program. See Petition by the Mass. Bar
Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d at 716. In contrast, response to the Florida solicitation was "predomin-
antly hostile," through much of the negative comment came as form letters. See In re Interest
on Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d 389, 390 & 390 n.2. (Fla. 1981). Some of the formal study
preceding the Texas decision to make the program mandatory is described infra at notes 146-
151 and accompanying text.
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courts, such as the United States Supreme Court and the Texas
Supreme Court, might not typically accompany administrative
actions with formal opinions.131 Nonetheless, the very fact of the
court's ruling still must be taken into account.'32 The United
States Supreme Court said as much in Hannah v. Plummer,133 a
constitutional challenge to a federal court rule, when it commented
that its administrative enactment of the Federal Rules of Procedure
constituted a "prima facie judgment" that the rule in question was
neither illegal nor unconstitutional."3
The Texas Supreme Court has issued at least three administra-
tive orders relating to the state IOLTA program that could have
constitutional ramifications: the 1984 order implementing a
voluntary program, the 1985 order specifying that the Texas Equal
Access to Justice Foundation owned the entire beneficial interest
in IOLTA account earnings, and the 1988 order converting to a
mandatory program. 3  None of these orders, however, was
credited by the Fifth Circuit as being any sort of a ruling, express
or implied, on the constitutionality of the Texas IOLTA program.
Under Texas law, administrative rulings by the Texas Supreme
Court must be treated as judgments on the constitutional validity
of the action. The point was made most clearly in a 1917 decision,
San Antonio & A.P Ry Co. v. Blair.136  In 1917, the Texas
Supreme Court faced a docket crisis. So many cases had been filed
that the court's three judges (long since increased to nine) found
themselves so busy sifting through filings to determine cases worthy
of review that they had no time remaining to hear cases and write
131. See Interview with Chief Justice Jack Pope, Supreme Court of Texas (Retired), July
29, 1997 (stating that the Texas Supreme Court does not, as a matter of practice, accompany
administrative orders with written opinions).
132. The American Bar Association has recognized this fact in a formal ethics opinion,
stating that participation by an attorney in an IOLTA program is ethical when a state
supreme court has implemented such a program and thus "implicitly or explicitly, has made
a determination that the interest earned is not the clients' property." ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348, at 8.
133. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
134. Id. at 471 (stating that a court can refuse to follow a Federal Rule of Procedure
"only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
constitutional considerations").
135. These orders are discussed in more detail infra at notes 142-45 and accompanying
text.
136. 196 S.W. 502 (Tex. 1917).
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opinions.137  Litigants had been waiting, on the average, more
than four years for rulings on their appeals.138
The legislature responded to this crisis of volume by enacting
a law that permitted the Texas Supreme Court to select a panel of
court of appeals judges to assist it in making the preliminary
determination of whether a case qualified for review,139 thus
freeing the supreme court to write opinions. By administrative
order of March 29, 1917, the court assigned a batch of pending
cases to this panel." A litigant whose case was denied review
filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the panel
screening process. The Texas Supreme Court issued an extensive
written opinion on the merits of the motion. The opinion began,
however, with a pointed observation:
The act was set in motion because of the court's view that it
was constitutional and valid, the various grounds urged against
it in all these motions having been fully considered. Had we
not determined it to be a valid act, we would not have proceed-
ed under it. It was intended, therefore, that our action in
inaugurating it should serve as in effect a judgment in respect
to its validity, and should be so understood. 4
As stated, the Texas Supreme Court has issued at least three
relevant rulings, each of which constitutes an affirmation of the
Texas IOLTA program's constitutionality. In 1984, the Texas
Supreme Court issued an administrative order implementing the
state's voluntary IOLTA program. 42 As already noted, Chief
Justice Jack Pope, the architect of the first Texas IOLTA program
and an acknowledged expert on state property law issues, presided
over the enactment. The Fifth Circuit's decision notwithstanding,
Chief Justice Pope's opinion today remains the same as it was in
1984: "There clearly are no constitutional implications. The only
137. See id. at 503. The problem was made worse by the fact that Texas followed a
system of non-discretionary "writ of error" review, necessitating that quasi-precedential "writ
notations" be assigned to all cases for which review was not granted. Anyone interested in
the details of this arcane system can consult Ted Z. Robertson & James W. Paulsen,
Rethinking the Texas Writ of Error System, 17 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 1 (1986).
138. See id. at 12.
139. The law is still on the books, codified as TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.007 (West
1988).
140. San Antonio & A.P. Ry Co. v. Blair, 196 S.W. at 503.
141. Id.
142. Texas Supreme Court Administrative Order of May 9, 1984 (available in Texas
Supreme Court clerk's office).
[Vol. 101:3
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO IOLTA
funds that qualify for IOLTA accounts are those that never could
have earned interest for the client anyway. Nothing is taken."'43
That conclusion is reinforced by the language of the order itself, in
which the Texas Supreme Court found that "on certain client funds
held by attorneys, interest income cannot reasonably be earned to
benefit individual clients for whom the funds are held."'" After
Chief Justice Pope retired at the end of 1984, Chief Justice John
Hill, a former state attorney general, implemented another
unanimous administrative order, which specified that the Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation "shall hold the entire beneficial
interest in the interest generated by and paid to the Founda-
tion."145
The history of the third administrative order, which converted
Texas to a mandatory IOLTA program, provides perhaps the
clearest evidence that the Texas Supreme Court actually deliberat-
ed upon the merits of the constitutional issues. In March 1988, the
state bar president appointed a ten-member IOLTA Study
Commission representing a broad spectrum of the legal commun-
ity.'" In accord with the Commission's positive findings, the
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation petitioned the Texas
Supreme Court for rule amendments making participation in the
IOLTA program mandatory for all attorneys who maintained
IOLTA-eligible trust accounts. 47  The brief supporting the
Foundation's petition discussed constitutional concerns and
contained numerous references to relevant court opinions on the
subject.'" Thus the Texas Supreme Court's order adopting the
mandatory IOLTA program149 not only carries with it an implied
143. Telephone interview with Chief Justice Jack Pope, Supreme Court of Texas
(Retired), July 26, 1997.
144. Texas Supreme Court Administrative Order of May 9, 1984 (available in Texas
Supreme Court clerk's office).
145. Texas Supreme Court Administrative Order of July 1, 1985 (available from Texas
Supreme Court clerk's office).
146. Petition to Amend Article XI, State Bar Rules and the Rules Governing the
Operation of the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation I I (Dec. 12, 1988) (available
from Texas Supreme Court clerk's office).
147. See id.
148. See State Bar Brief in Support of Petition to Amend Article XI, State Bar Rules
Governing the Operation of the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation 3-4 (Dec. 12,
1988) (copy available from the authors).
149. Texas Supreme Court Administrative Order of Dec. 13, 1988 (available from the
Texas Supreme Court clerk's office).
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ruling on the constitutionality of the program,15 ° it also carries a
"legislative history" which demonstrates the court's express
consideration of the issue."'
The Fifth Circuit's failure to give any legal weight to the Texas
Supreme Court's authoritative administrative orders on the state's
IOLTA program is puzzling. Even more puzzling is the failure of
the Fifth Circuit, if it had any doubts, to take advantage of the
certification process to obtain a definitive ruling from the Texas
Supreme Court, as the United States Supreme Court recently has
recommended. 52
Like some states, Texas has adopted a process whereby federal
courts can avoid the necessity for indulging in Erie-educated
guesses by certifying a doubtful question to the state's high
court.1 5  Whatever may be said of the 1972 Texas Sellers opinion,
it surely is not on-point binding authority for the constitutionality
of the state's IOLTA program. Moreover, on motion for en banc
rehearing, the defendants specifically suggested the possibility of
certification."5 Six judges dissented from the denial of en banc
rehearing, four of them joining in a written opinion questioning the
merits of the panel's legal determination."' Nonetheless, the
Fifth Circuit did not choose to certify the state law question to the
state's high court.156
150. See supra text accompanying notes 136-41.
151. A contemporaneous bar journal article summarizing the new IOLTA rule also
sketched out the constitutional authority on the issue. See Harold F. Kleinman and W. Frank
Newton, Court Orders IOLTA Conversion; An Overview of the Program, 52 TEx. B. J. 172,
173 (1989) (discussing California and Eleventh Circuit opinions).
152. See Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S Ct. 1055, 1074 (1997) (stating
that "[g]iven the novelty of the question and its potential importance to the conduct of
Arizona's business, plus the views of the Attorney General and those of Article XXVIII's
sponsors, the certification requests merited more respectful consideration than they received
in the proceedings below").
153. The Texas certification procedure was authorized by constitutional amendment and
implemented by court rule. See TEx. CONST. art. V., § 3-c; TEX. R. App. P. 114. A general
discussion of the subject, and of Texas Supreme Court-Fifth Circuit relations on certification
issues, can be found in James W. Paulsen & Gregory S. Coleman, Fifth Circuit Survey: Civil
Procedure, 25 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 509, 538-41 (1994).
154. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 19 n.10, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
(United States Supreme Court 1996) (No. 96-1578).
155. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 106
F.3d 640 (1997) (Benavides, J., dissenting from suggestion of rehearing en banc.
156. One possibility, aside from the obvious conclusion that the Fifth Circuit knew the
answer it would get, is that the Fifth Circuit chose not to use the certification process because
of less-than-satisfactory past results from the Texas Supreme Court. See, e.g., Paulsen &
Coleman, supra note 153, at 538-41 (discussing unpleasant relations between the two courts
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The United States Supreme Court has recently made it clear
that lower court decisions are not entitled to deference on
determinations of state law.157 In the past, the Supreme Court
also has upheld the right of the Texas Supreme Court to make final
decisions of questions of state law, even though the Supreme Court
might not have made the same determination, were the question an
original one.15 One might therefore expect that the United
States Supreme Court will give appropriate legal weight to the
constitutional implications of the Texas Supreme Court's adminis-
trative rulings on the IOLTA program.
C. A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: False Assump-
tions About Attorney Trust Accounts, and the Nonexistent
"Property Interest" That Flows From Those Assumptions
Leaving to one side the basic analytical errors and refusal to
credit authoritative state rulings already discussed, the Fifth
Circuit's analysis of property interests implicated by IOLTA
accounts still is fundamentally unsound. In part, the decision is
unsound because it relies on metaphor as a substitute for close
legal analysis. IOLTA programs, to the panel, are an effort to
"create" 'something from nothing,"' a "modem-day attempt at
alchemy whereby IOLTA supporters change "ordinary metals into
precious gold." '159 This attempt, the panel held, fails because
IOLTA proceeds "are not.., the fruit of alchemy, but.., the fruit
of the clients' principal deposits."1"
The Fifth Circuit does not, however, rely entirely on fractured
analogies or mangled metaphors. It is, in fact, the court's serious
attempt to discuss the detailed workings of an IOLTA account that
most clearly exposes the serious analytical flaws in the opinion. At
on certification procedures).
157. See, e.g., Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (stating that "a
court of appeals should review de novo a district court's determination of state Law").
158. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 n.7 (1984)
(stating that "It is not within our province, of course, to determine whether the Texas
Supreme Court correctly interpreted the State's long-arm statute").
159. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1000.
160. Id. At one level, it is tempting simply to respond to the Fifth Circuit's rhetorical
flights in kind. One might fairly observe that the Fifth Circuit's attempt to distill a legal rule
of universal application from a factually inapposite case more closely resembles the
alchemist's dream of finding a universal solvent that will dissolve all it touches than it does
traditional legal analysis. One might also observe that the treatment of interest as "fruit"
is questionable because, at least in Texas, money does not grow on trees.
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a critical juncture in the discussion, the panel criticized the
Eleventh Circuit's Cone decision because the Cone court suppos-
edly "failed to consider the precise events of the transaction.1
161
The Fifth Circuit explained that a bank handling an IOLTA
account first credits interest, than deducts service charges. This
"two-step process," to the panel, has profound implications,
because "a property interest attaches the moment that the interest
accrues."
162
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of this supposedly pivotal event in
the operation of a bank account is a genuine attempt to grapple
with the details of an attorney trust account. The analysis is,
however, fatally incomplete. Assuming for the moment that the
Fifth Circuit's analysis is internally correct, so far as bank account-
ing procedures go,"6 the panel still ignored several crucial prelim-
inary steps. First, an attorney contacts with a financial institution
to establish an IOLTA account. Second, a client delivers funds to
the attorney. Third, the attorney deposits the money. Only after
these events have taken place would interest accrue and service
charges be deducted. Appropriate consideration of these steps
does not eliminate the question of whether an IOLTA program is
a constitutional taking. It does, however, demonstrate that the
Fifth Circuit's focus, and the way in which the court framed the
takings issue, does not reflect reality. Viewed from a banking law
standpoint, the posting of interest and debiting of service charges
occur so late in the process as to be completely meaningless, so far
as client property rights are concerned.
The most critical step, though wholly ignored by the Fifth
Circuit panel, is the first step. In Texas, conventional interest is
created by contract.' 64 If the terms of the account agreement do
not provide for the payment of interest, as was the case with pre-
IOLTA attorney trust accounts, then funds deposited in that
account will earn no interest. The bank may well use the funds to
generate profits, but the depositor has no property right to those
161. Id. at 1003.
162. Id.
163. Treatment of the posting of interest and deduction of service charges as a "two-step"
process is highly questionable. See infra note 173, and accompanying text.
164. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 (West 1987) (defining "Conventional
Interest" as "that interest which is agreed upon and fixed by the parties to a written
contract").
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profits. It even would be wrong, by statutory definition, to refer to
bank earnings attributable to any given deposit as "interest.""t
The Fifth Circuit's failure to recognize the second and third
steps in the process-client delivery of funds to the attorney and
attorney deposit of those funds into the trust account-also
significantly undermines its reasoning. The true nature of the
relationship created by an attorney trust account has been set out
by a recent Texas appeals case."6 An attorney's trust account
was frozen by his bank in response to a personal writ of garnish-
ment. The attorney sued, claiming that the trust funds were not
"his" money, and that the bank acted wrongly. In the course of
approving the bank's action, the Austin Court of Appeals described
the nature of the relationship in simple terms:
[Attorney] Townsend's general account created between him
and the bank a relationship of creditor and debtor. The bank
acquired legal title to the sums deposited in the trust account,
and these sums lost their separate identity by merging in the
bank's general "funds," by means of checks drawn by him
against the account ....
The very name of the account, "C. N. Townsend, Escrow
Account," indicated that others might have a right against
Townsend by reason of his deposits to the account. The bank
was not obliged, however, to undertake any inquiry in that
regard merely because of the name of the account. Even
though third persons might have legal and equitable rights
against Townsend as their trustee, the bank had by reason of
the bank account a legal relationship with him alone.'67
In sum, the right to interest is created by the account contract.
The client delivers funds to the attorney. The attorney deposits
those funds in the bank. These facts, and the legal conclusions that
flow naturally from those facts. demonstrate that no client has any
property interest in the interest generated by a Texas IOLTA
account, because the bank has no relationship with the client. So
far as the bank is concerned, absent special knowledge or circum-
165. See id.
166. Texas Commerce Bank-New Braunfels, N.A. v. Townsend, 786 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, writ denied). The case was selected as the lead case for an ALR
annotation. See Randy R. Koenders, Annot., What Constitutes Wrongful Dishonor of Check
Rendering Payor Bank Liable to Drawer Under UCC § 4-402, 88 A.L.R. 4th 568 (1996). For
what it is worth, the secondary author of this article was appellate counsel for the bank.
167. Townsend, 786 S.W.2d at 54 (emphasis in original).
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stances, its contract responsibilities are solely to the attorney
depositor. So far as the client is concerned, any complaint arises
when the attorney places funds into a IOLTA account, rather than
handling those funds in some alternative manner. It is all a matter
of contract rights.
More specifically, ownership of interest, and any other
property rights created in the account, would be determined by the
terms of the deposit agreement, and by reference to the law in
compliance with which such an agreement is made. Critically,
IOLTA rules provide that the Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation "shall hold the entire beneficial interest in the interest
earned" on an IOLTA account.' 68  A standard notice form
references the IOLTA rules and directs that interest earned on
accounts be paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Founda-
tion.169 A standard agreement between depository institution and
attorney authorizes debits and credits to the account for the
Foundation's benefit. 170  The standard "IOLTA Remittance
Report" requires financial institutions to place the Foundation's
taxpayer ID number on all IOLTA accounts, to refrain from
backup tax withholding on interest in deference to the Foundation's
tax-exempt status, and to remit net interest and a consolidated
report to the Foundation.
171
The conclusion from these facts is inescapable: by law, and by
contracts executed with reference to that law, the interest generated
by IOLTA accounts belongs to the Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation from the moment the account is set up. Nothing in the
law, or in contracts executed in compliance with that law, suggests
that either the attorney or client ever has any property right,
however transitory, to that interest. To the contrary, the "entire
beneficial interest"172 in IOLTA interest belongs to the Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation from the moment the account
is set up. Thus, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's explicit assumption,
the process of crediting interest and deducting service charges does
not transfer a property interest from the client to the Foundation;
168. IOLTA Rule 4.
169. See IOLTA Notice to Financial Institution and Foundation (copy available from the
authors).
170. See, e.g., Texas Commerce Bancshares Authorization Agreement for IOLTA
Debits/Credits (copy on file with the authors).
171. See IOLTA Remittance Report (copy available from the authors).
172. IOLTA Rule 4 (emphasis added).
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it is simply a mathematical calculation to determine precisely what
the Foundation already owns by virtue of the pre-existing contract
terms.173
To reiterate, the observation that the Fifth Circuit fundamen-
tally misunderstood the timing of the transfer of ownership to the
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, the contractual nature
of the relationship, and the relevant rights and duties does not
eliminate the question of whether a client property interest is at
issue, or whether a taking of that interest has occurred. It does,
however, demonstrate that the posting of interest and deduction of
service fees are legally meaningless events, and that the Fifth
Circuit's decision to focus on those events is legally and logically
unwarranted. Moreover, close consideration of the actual legal
relationships of the parties points in the direction of a dispositive
answer, the answer already reached by all other courts that have
considered the issue.
A critical point to keep in mind is that there are two distinct
contractual relationships at issue in any IOLTA-eligible client
173. It is questionable how closely the Fifth Circuit's "two-step" analysis of crediting
interest to an account, then deducting a service charge, approximates the reality of banking
practice. Financial institutions that handle multiple IOLTA accounts are required to forward
a consolidated remittance report, along with a cashier's check, to the Texas Equal Access to
Justice Foundation. See IOLTA Remittance Report (copy available from the authors). At
least some of these institutions set up a separate account, or a separate automated
bookkeeping system to which the interest from all IOLTA accounts is initially credited, and
from which the service charges are paid. If a statement of interest and service charges
showed up on an attorney's trust account statement, then, it would only be as a courtesy item
of information, and not a reflection of an actual entry and debit in the particular account.
Interview with Joyce Lindsey, Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, July 29, 1997.
The essentially integrated nature of what the Fifth Circuit has perceived as a distinct
"two-step" process is described in bank promotional literature. For example, "interest
payments from Texas Commerce IOLTA are automated and paid to the Texas Equal Access
to Justice Foundation monthly." TEXAS COMMERCE BANK, INTEREST ON LAWYERS TRUST
ACCOuNTs (IOLTA) (copy on file with the authors). Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's supposi-
tion that crediting and debiting takes place within the individual trust account, Texas
Commerce Bank states that "monthly maintenance and reporting charges are paid by the
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation from the interest payments they receive." Id.
(emphasis added).
Different financial institutions may choose to handle the calculation and remittance
of IOLTA funds in different ways. Vagaries in bookkeeping procedure, however, are not
important. By contract and law, the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation always owns
the interest, no matter how the bank may choose to handle the paperwork. In a footnote,
the Fifth Circuit criticized defenders of the IOLTA program for relying on the "fickle tax
code" in their analysis of property interests. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004. One
might fairly ask, however, whether the Fifth Circuit has not hinged its decision on an even
more fickle consideration: the accounting idiosyncrasies of individual financial institutions.
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relationship: the contract between lawyer and client, and the
contract between lawyer and financial institution. The Austin
Court of Appeals decision in the Townsend case correctly empha-
sizes the fact that, absent some special knowledge or relationship,
the financial institution owes no duty to the clients, but only to the
lawyer with whom the IOLTA account is established. 4 If client
rights are infringed in the establishment or operation of an IOLTA
account, then the infringement occurs when the lawyer accepts
client trust funds. The client has no rights beyond that initial
contract.
A client who places a sum of money in the care of an attorney
has at least a moral right to expect that the money will be kept
safely, and if possible, that the money be put to productive use.
An attorney has at least an ethical obligation to do the same.175
Both before and after the Texas IOLTA program was implement-
ed, an attorney was expected to deposit client funds in an interest-
bearing account, if interest could be earned for the client. The
IOLTA program affects only those nominal or short-term deposits
for which such a segregated account would not be economically
practical. Before IOLTA, these funds would have been placed in
a non-interest bearing account.17 6 The client thus had no reason-
able expectation of receiving any interest. After IOLTA, the
attorney is required to place such funds into an interest-bearing
account, but one in which the account terms grant all beneficial
interest to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation. The
client still has no reasonable expectation of receiving interest.
From the financial perspective of the client, nothing has changed:
no expectation of interest before IOLTA and none after. The
client's contract rights and expectations are unchanged. No
property right is implicated and no taking has occurred.
Although no case to date has expressed the concept in
precisely these terms, the analysis is completely compatible with the
gist of many courts' reasoning. In Webb's, the United States
Supreme Court stated at the outset of the analysis that "a mere
unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest
174. See Townsend, 786 S.W.2d at 54 (stating that "if a bank becomes aware of a possible
misappropriation by a trustee, it may, of course, come under a legal duty to protect third
persons until their legal and equitable rights against the trustee can be determined in the
final judgment of a court") (emphasis added).
175. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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entitled to protection."'" Aside from the Fifth Circuit, the courts
that have examined the issue to date read this language as
requiring a realistic determination, from the client's perspective, at
the time funds are placed with an attorney.7 ' The only funds
placed in an IOLTA account are those which, unlike the funds at
issue in Webb's and Sellers, could not reasonably be expected to
earn interest on their own. The lack of any reasonable expectation
is highlighted by comparing such a client's pre-IOLTA and post-
IOLTA options. There is no reasonable expectation of interest
under either scenario.
D. A Postscript on Public Policy
The Fifth Circuit did not rest its decision entirely on its view
of Texas property law. It offered a public policy justification, that
a decision to uphold IOLTA programs would "incite a new gold
rush,"'7 9 whereby government agencies would pore through
banking regulations to discover other instances in which banks have
been using deposits without charging interest, then seize that
interest for the "public good." The only example the panel offered
was "float" time, that period of time after a check is deposited and
the bank receives provisional credit with the Federal Reserve but
before the check is credited to the customer's account and interest
begins to accrue."8 The panel's specific concern was that, buoyed
by a decision favorable to the Texas IOLTA program, a govern-
ment agency might step in, pass a regulation and funnel this
"'unclaimed' interest" '' to some worthy cause. The Fifth Circuit
concluded: "[W]e cannot believe that such anomalies ... create
funds that belong to nobody."'"
The Fifth Circuit's concern is misplaced and its analogy to
IOLTA is deficient. First, if a state agency had the temerity to
interfere with the highly structured federal regulatory scheme
governing deposits, in the manner described by the Fifth Circuit,
one would expect speedy and preemptive federal regulation to
177. 449 U.S. at 161.
178. See e.g., Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007 (stating that in Webb's, contrary to a typical IOLTA
account, "the interest earned on the interpleader funds deposited pursuant to the Florida
statute did give rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement").
179. Washington Legal Found, 94 F.3d at 1003.
180. See id at 1003-04.
181. id. at 1003.
182. Id. at 1004.
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result. Second, the specific history of this particular "anomaly"
should have allayed the Fifth Circuit's fears. As the opinion
concedes, recent federal law has addressed the issue of "float," at
least so far as banks are concerned. The upshot of this government
"interference" is that individual depositors, not government
agencies, now receive the interest.
More fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit's concerns are misplaced
because IOLTA programs are not foisted upon banks by overzeal-
ous regulators. No bank is required to participate in IOLTA.
Each financial institution that administers IOLTA accounts has
freely contracted to do so. Each such institution undoubtedly has
made a business decision to offer the IOLTA product to its
attorney depositors. It is a far stretch indeed for the Fifth Circuit
to leap from voluntary IOLTA contracts to state-sponsored
government raids on bank profits, and the panel does not offer any
reasoning that would make logical leap plausible.
Moreover, the image of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Washing-
ton Legal Foundation as the equivalent of a little Dutch boy with
his finger in the dike, bravely holding back impending torrents of
government raiders, does not stand up to close examination. More
than a decade of decisions from a variety of state and federal
courts have consistently confirmed the constitutionality of IOLTA
programs. Therefore, if IOLTA programs really were the first step
down a slippery slope to wholesale government raids, the Fifth
Circuit would have been able to come up with concrete examples
by this time.
This is not to say, however, that there will be no public
consequences of the Fifth Circuit's ruling. There will be conse-
quences, and those consequences could profoundly upset the
structure of the banking industry. The Fifth Circuit has used the
phrase "interest follows principal" as an overarching common law
rule which can supplant the legitimate contractual expectations of
the parties. If permitted to stand, the new extra-contractual rights
and duties created by the panel's ruling will be a potential boon to
plaintiff's class action lawyers.
For example, standard demand deposit accounts (DDAs) do
not bear interest, and standard DDA contracts so provide. Under
the rationale of the current panel opinion, however, depositors in
the Fifth Circuit apparently have some inchoate property right to
millions, if not billions, of dollars of bank profits from the use of
the money deposited, on the theory that this is undistributed
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"interest". In response to such a post-Washington Legal Founda-
tion class action suit, a bank undoubtedly would invoke the Federal
Reserve Act's general prohibition on interest-bearing DDAs.
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Yet, by requiring banks to keep all profits made by use of DDA
customers' money, the Federal Reserve Act would share the same
constitutional infirmity that the panel perceives in Texas IOLTA
regulations. True, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
this provision of the Federal Reserve Act is "aimed at ensuring
sound banking practices, '"" a concern of such importance to the
states in the Fifth Circuit in recent years. Yet this is not better
excuse for "depriving" depositors of "their" interest, as the panel
would see it, than is the massive unmet need for legal service to
poor Texans.
If the Fifth Circuit's theory were correct, however, all would
not be lost for financial institutions. Bankers could assert new-
found rights against the federal government. Under federal law,
financial institutions are required to keep large deposits with the
Federal Reserve Banks as "sterile" or non-interest bearing
reserves.1" The Federal Reserve profits greatly from the "free"
use of these funds, and the national deficit is undoubtedly smaller
as a result. Nonetheless, under the Fifth Circuit's ruling, these
federal regulations would-under analysis similar that just offered
with respect to DDA accounts-be subject to constitutional
challenge on "takings" grounds. Examples might be multiplied, but
the lesson should be clear: it is the Fifth Circuit's ruling, not the
analysis of every other court to address the issue, that offers a new
rule of law, wrong in its specific application and dangerous in its
logical consequences.
The Fifth Circuit's failure to determine property rights by
reference to the contracts of the parties could, carried to its logical
conclusion, destroy the entire business of banking. Banks make
money by accepting deposits, making more money from the use of
funds than they pay to the depositors, and pocketing the difference.
At present, that practice is good business. Under the Fifth Circuit's
extreme view of depositor rights, however, ordinary banking
practice is theft. Other than a deduction for reasonable service
183. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 371a (1989). The panel decision currently observes that
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts are a major exception to this general
prohibition. 94 F.3d at 998.
184. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 329 (1963).
185. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(c)(1989); 12 C.F.R. § 204 (1997).
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charges, any profits made by the financial institution from use of
the "depositor's money would belong to the depositor, on the
principle that the depositor owns all "interest."
Such results as these would be absurd, and surely would not be
condoned by any court. Nonetheless, the fact that ridiculous results
can so quickly be reached by extending the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit's opinion illustrates just how far removed that opinion is
from the realities of banking law, and from the actual contractual
relationships of those affected by the IOLTA program.
V. Conclusion
Phillips is not a case that flits about in the lofty heavens of
cutting-edge constitutional jurisprudence. Instead, to resolve the
nationally important questions presented in the case, one first must
trudge through the underbrush, examining the banking law realities
of how an IOLTA account actually works, and determining what
the state law contract rights and obligations of the parties actually
are. The Fifth Circuit, unwilling to do so, reduced Texas law to an
abstract universal rule, then applied that rule without regard to the
specific facts. One can hope for better from the United States
Supreme Court. Indeed, one can confidently expect that the Court
which considered its ruling in Webb's so limited that it might not
even apply to all interpleader interest statutes86 will not extend
its holding to a very different factual and legal setting without close
consideration of the profound dissimilarities in the two situations.
186. See supra note 98.
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